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RE-IMPRISONMENT WITHOUT A JURY TRIAL: 
SUPERVISED RELEASE AND THE PROBLEM OF 
SECOND-CLASS STATUS 
 




The Supreme Court’s 2019 decision in United States v. Haymond shone a light on 
a practice that has not yet received attention commensurate with its significance: the 
re-imprisonment of individuals on supervised release without a jury trial. At first 
blush, the decision is most notable for setting bounds on the government’s ability to 
re-imprison individuals on supervised release without observing the constitutional 
rights normally available to defendants in criminal prosecutions. However, 
examination of the opinions reveals that the decision’s immediate doctrinal impact 
was quite limited. Moreover, although the three opinions issued in the case reflected 
disagreements among the Justices, all of the Justices nevertheless took for granted a 
proposition that ought to be recognized as remarkable: namely, that it is acceptable for 
individuals released from prison to be subjected for extended periods of time to a status 
of significantly diminished constitutional protection. This Article challenges the 
practice of re-imprisoning individuals on supervised release without the normal 
constitutional protections, contending that its current widespread acceptance is based 
on underlying assumptions that do not hold up to scrutiny. 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
The Supreme Court’s 2019 decision in United States v. Haymond1 shone a light on 
an issue that has not yet received attention commensurate with its significance: the 
common practice of re-imprisoning individuals on supervised release without a jury 
trial. Although the decision’s immediate doctrinal impact was quite limited, Haymond 
was notable for setting constraints on the government’s ability to re-imprison 
individuals on supervised release without observing the constitutional rights normally 
available to defendants in criminal prosecutions.  
In some respects, the three separate opinions issued in the case indicated 
substantial divisions among the Justices. In particular, Justice Neil Gorsuch’s opinion 
for the four plurality Justices rested its reasoning on a precedent—Apprendi v. New 
Jersey2—that Justice Samuel Alito’s opinion for the four dissenting Justices 
considered inapplicable.3 Meanwhile, in providing a fifth vote for the majority, Justice 
Stephen Breyer’s concurring opinion largely sided with the dissent, including its view 
that Apprendi was inapposite, but found other grounds to reach the same outcome as 
the plurality on the dispute at hand. Notwithstanding the significant disagreements 
between the plurality and dissenting Justices, however, all three of the opinions in 
Haymond took for granted a proposition that ought to be recognized as remarkable: 
namely, that it is acceptable for individuals released from prison to be subjected for 
extended periods of time to a status of significantly diminished constitutional 
protection.  
After individuals convicted of crimes complete a term in prison, they are 
commonly subject to a period of “supervised release,” which conditions their 
continued liberty on a variety of requirements, including that they do not commit 
additional crimes.4 If the government believes that a person on supervised release has 
violated one or more of the requirements, it may seek a term of re-imprisonment. 
Although individuals in these circumstances are potentially subject to long terms of 
imprisonment, they are not entitled to the full set of constitutional rights normally 
afforded to defendants in criminal cases. Most notably, they are not provided a trial in 
which guilt must be demonstrated “beyond a reasonable doubt” to a jury.5 Rather, their 
 
1 United States v. Haymond, 139 S. Ct. 2369, 2373 (2019). 
2 Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 468 (2006). 
3 Haymond, 139 S. Ct. at 2379 (citing Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 468); id. at 2388–89 (Alito, J. 
dissenting). Justice Gorsuch’s plurality opinion was joined by Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg, 
Sonia Sotomayor, and Elena Kagan. Justice Alito’s dissenting opinion was joined by Chief 
Justice John Roberts, and Justices Clarence Thomas and Brett Kavanaugh.  
4 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d). See generally ADMIN. OFF. OF THE U.S. CTS. PROB. & 




5 The Sixth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution guarantees that the accused in “all criminal 
prosecutions shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury,” U.S CONST. 
amend. VI, and the Supreme Court has long held that due process requires that the guilt of 
2https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol69/iss3/6
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cases are decided by judges at evidentiary hearings in which the government must 
only demonstrate the defendant’s guilt by “a preponderance of the evidence” 
(indicating that the government’s allegations are more likely than not to be true).6  
In 2019, in the federal system alone—this Article’s principal focus—there were 
over 111,000 individuals on supervised release.7 A 2010 study by the United States 
Sentencing Commission reported that the federal court system had by that point 
imposed terms of supervised release on nearly one million individuals.8 Indeed, the 
vast majority of federal offenders who are sentenced to prison also serve terms of 
supervised release. Terms of supervised release do not merely represent brief stints 
while an individual freed from prison is getting settled into the logistical details of a 
new life. Rather, the average term of supervised release is nearly four years.9 
Throughout this entire period, individuals on supervised release may be re-imprisoned 
for up to five years without anything close to the constitutional protections that would 
normally be afforded to an individual facing the full force of the criminal law. Nor is 
the threat of revocation merely theoretical; roughly one-third of individuals sentenced 
to terms of supervised release are subjected to revocation and re-imprisonment for an 
average term of nearly a year, and, in some cases, for much longer terms.10 In 2018 
alone, the federal courts adjudicated almost 17,000 revocations of supervised 
release.11  
This Article argues that the practice of re-imprisoning individuals on supervised 
release without the normal constitutional protections is not justified. Part II sets the 
context for the contemporary practice of supervised release by examining its 
background in the adoption of a parole system over a century ago. It is striking that 
the current system affords greatly diminished rights for large populations of people 
who are not imprisoned, and that the practice is so widely accepted. We might have 
expected the Supreme Court block this practice. To the contrary, however, the Justices 
have articulated justifications for it. Part III discusses those justifications, which pivot 
on the legal fiction that revocation of supervised release does not constitute the 
imposition of a new punishment. Instead, according to this line of reasoning, the 
revocation of supervised release should be understood simply as part of the ongoing 
 
criminal charges be established “beyond a reasonable doubt.” In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 361 
(1970).  
6 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3). 
7 Federal Judicial Caseload Statistics 2019, U.S. CTS., https://www.uscourts.gov/statistics-
reports/federal-judicial-caseload-statistics-2019 [https://perma.cc/URE3-H4Y9]. 
8 U. S. SENT’G COMM’N, FEDERAL OFFENDERS SENTENCED TO SUPERVISED RELEASE 3 (2010), 
https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/research-
publications/2010/20100722_Supervised_Release.pdf [https://perma.cc/A6BA-2EQW]. 




10 U. S. SENT’G COMM’N, supra note 8, at 63. 
11 United States v. Haymond, 139 S. Ct. 2369, 2388 (2019) (Alito, J., dissenting). 
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administration of the original sentence of imprisonment. Part IV contends that the 
justifications for the current system do not hold up to scrutiny. Once the notion that 
revocation of supervised release does not constitute a new punishment is exposed as a 
fiction, the commonly repeated justifications for the diminished rights available at 
revocation hearings fall apart. We are left, then, with a system that unjustifiably 
deprives numerous individuals of the most cherished protections in our criminal 
justice system. Since these are individuals who have already completed their prison 
terms and resumed their lives, this practice has the effect of relegating a large 
population of individuals to a second-class status of rights protection. In the absence 
of a valid basis for the establishment of such an inferior status, the practice should be 
recognized as deeply problematic. Part V highlights how little Haymond altered the 
practice of re-imprisonment without a jury trial, and how much is at stake for 
individuals on supervised release. 
II. HOW WE GOT HERE—FROM PAROLE TO SUPERVISED RELEASE   
A. Parole and the Historical Background of Supervised Release 
To put the contemporary practice of supervised release in context, it is necessary 
to consider its historical roots in the much earlier adoption of a parole system. In the 
period shortly after the Constitution’s ratification, the predominant view of criminal 
penalties was that they served a retributive purpose: to mete out the punishment that 
criminals deserved based on the offenses committed.12 This view about the aim of 
punishment had implications for the manner in which sentences were determined. If 
the penalty was intended as retribution for the offense committed, then it made sense 
to link the determination of the sentence tightly to the nature of the offense. The 
relevant variables were those differentiating one kind of crime from another. This 
conception of punishment’s aim, then, did not focus attention on variables 
differentiating one perpetrator from another.13 Since, unlike individual human beings, 
the facts of an act already committed cannot change, this view of punishment’s aim 
did not require an updating of the time to be served in prison based on events 
transpiring after the sentencing. As a result, those sentenced to prison commonly 
served their terms in full.14 
The emphasis on punishment’s retributive aims made questions about when 
defendants enjoyed certain constitutional rights pertaining to criminal procedure 
relatively straightforward. Consider the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee that “in all 
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by 
an impartial jury . . . .”15 Under the early model of criminal penalties as retribution, 
determining when the jury right applied was generally uncomplicated because 
 
12 Robert McClendon, Note, Supervising Supervised Release: Where the Courts Went Wrong 




15 U.S CONST. amend. VI. 
4https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol69/iss3/6
2021]      RE-IMPRISONMENT WITHOUT A JURY TRIAL  573 
“criminal prosecution” for Sixth Amendment purposes meant simply the stage where 
the government brought formal accusations against the defendant.16  
By the end of the nineteenth century, however, a major shift had occurred in 
attitudes regarding the principal aims of punishment. By this time, the prevailing view 
was that punishment should aim to rehabilitate criminals, reforming their character 
and reintegrating them into society.17 This shift in attitudes regarding the aim of 
criminal penalties played a critical role in the adoption of parole as an overarching 
approach to punishment. The guiding idea behind parole was that sentences should be 
administered in a manner tailored to the circumstances of particular individuals in an 
effort to reintegrate them into society as law-abiding members of society.18 Pursuing 
such a vision required responsiveness to each person’s progress, and this meant an 
approach to sentencing that was individualized and flexible. Not all individuals 
convicted of crimes progress toward safe and productive reentry into society at the 
same pace. Sadly, some individuals never make any progress at all. Others, however, 
demonstrate signs of readiness for reintegration relatively soon after beginning to 
serve their prison terms.19 Thus, the system had to allow for adjustment in the light of 
developments that took place after the initial announcement of a prison term. This was 
a change from the previous system. Since the earlier model that predominated in the 
nation’s early history tied sentences to the nature of the crimes committed—which did 
not change after the fact—it did not require the same kind of flexibility in 
administering sentences. 
To instill the requisite flexibility, the new model of criminal justice allowed for 
discretion in a number of ways. Through the establishment of broad penalty ranges, 
judges were afforded a good deal of discretion in determining the sentence for 
particular defendants at the outset. Within the sentencing range provided by 
legislation, judges could sentence defendants to a narrower range of time that they 
might have to serve. Moreover, once the minimum sentence was served, a parole 
board—an arm of the executive branch—exercised discretion in determining the 
actual release date. Within the prescribed range, parole boards could grant an earlier 
release based on good behavior and progress toward rehabilitation.20 In some cases, 
individuals could be released from prison after serving as little as one-third of the 
original maximum range on their sentence.21 While individuals in the parole system 
could be released early, such individuals—known as “parolees”—were subject to 
 
16 Haymond, 139 S. Ct. at 2376. 
17 Morrisey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 477 (1972). 
18 Helen Leland Witmer, The History, Theory, and Results of Parole, 18 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 24, 51 (1927). 
19 McClendon, supra note 12, at 180. 
20 Christine S. Scott-Hayward, Shadow Sentencing: The Imposition of Federal Supervised 
Release, 18 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 180, 188–89 (2013). 
21 James Horner, Haymond’s Riddles: Supervised Release, the Jury Trial Right, and the 
Government’s Path Forward, 57 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 275, 279 (2020). 
5Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2021
574 CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [69:569 
certain requirements which they had to fulfill in order to retain their freedom.22 In 
addition to reporting periodically to their parole officer, parolees were required to 
comply with a variety of other conditions, such as that they not consume alcohol or 
associate with certain persons, or that they not travel, marry, or change employment 
without the permission of their assigned parole officer.23   
If the government believed that a parolee had violated the conditions of release, it 
could seek a determination from a parole board to revoke parole and return the 
individual to prison for part or all of the remaining time on the initial sentence. Parole 
boards did not have to afford parolees anything like the rights associated with a 
criminal trial before making a determination to revoke parole. In particular, parole 
could be revoked on nothing more than a finding by a preponderance of the evidence 
that individuals had violated the conditions of parole.24 Especially since re-imprisoned 
parolees did not usually receive credit for the time while they were on parole, the 
stakes at a parole hearing could be very high if the parolees were found to have 
violated the conditions of release. Indeed, a parolee might face many years of 
additional time in prison if found to have violated the conditions of release. 
Nevertheless, despite the stakes, the determination was made by an executive body 
without affording the protections that the accused would face at a criminal trial. Nor 
was revocation of parole uncommon, as approximately 40% of parolees were returned 
to prison before completing the time on their period of parole.25  
Parole became the dominant model of criminal justice during the twentieth 
century. Most states adopted some version of a parole system early in the century, and 
every state had adopted it by the middle of the century.26 Congress adopted parole for 
the federal criminal system in 1910 in a form that was similar to the basic system 
commonly used at the state level.27  
By the 1970s, however, the drumbeat of opposition to parole was growing louder. 
While criticism of parole took many forms, a particularly influential line of attack 
centered on two principal claims: that parole gave rise to excessive uncertainty and 
arbitrariness regarding the length of prison terms, and that it did not actually fulfill its 
rehabilitative aims in any event.28 One reason these criticisms gained so much traction 
was that they appealed to both sides of the political spectrum. Regarding the 
indeterminacy of prison terms, for instance, liberals could stress the implications for 
fairness and racial equality, while conservatives could decry the possibility for 
criminals to evade adequate punishment.29 Observers also charged that the parole 
 
22 Scott-Hayward, supra note 20, at 196. 
23 Morrisey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 478 (1972). 
24 Horner, supra note 21, at 279. 
25 Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 479. 
26 McClendon, supra note 12, at 181. 
27 Id. 
28 Scott-Hayward, supra note 20, at 189–90. 
29 Fiona Doherty, Indeterminate Sentencing Returns: The Invention of Supervised Release, 
88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 958, 991–95 (2013). 
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system needlessly tied the period of supervision to the original prison term.30 That is, 
no matter how clearly individuals’ behavior gave indications of rehabilitation, they 
had to remain within the parole system until the end of the maximum amount of time 
on the initial sentence. Conversely, individuals who showed no signs of rehabilitation 
whatsoever could not be kept under any kind of supervision beyond the expiration of 
the initial sentence.31  
B. The Establishment of Supervised Release 
Motivated in large part by the aim of addressing perceived drawbacks of the parole 
system, Congress in 1984 replaced it with a new model that incorporated supervised 
release as a means of maintaining official supervision over individuals after they were 
freed from prison.32 Without abandoning the rehabilitative aspirations of parole, the 
new system sought to foster a greater level of predictability and consistency regarding 
the length of prison terms.33  
To appreciate the distinctiveness of supervised release, it is helpful to recall the 
basic logic of the parole system that it replaced. In parole, the initial sentence included 
a maximum amount of time to be served in prison. An individual could be released 
from prison prior to the end of that maximum term, perhaps after serving as little as 
one third of that term. However, no matter when individuals were released from 
prison, they were necessarily kept within the parole system until the passage of the 
time remaining on their maximum sentence. To illustrate, suppose an individual was 
sentenced to a maximum of ten years, and a parole board later authorized release after 
five years. Assuming the parole was not later revoked, the individual would remain 
on parole for the next five years, until completion of the time remaining on the original 
sentence. In the parole system, then, while there was indeterminacy regarding how 
much of the original ten-year sentence the individual would actually serve in prison, 
there was certainty regarding the maximum amount of time that the individual could 
serve in prison. Moreover, except in cases where parole was revoked without credit 
for time served on parole, there was also certainty regarding the combined amount of 
time that the individual would remain either in prison or on parole.  
There are, to be sure, important similarities between parole and supervised release. 
Like parole, supervised release applies only after individuals serve time in prison.34 
Thus, neither parole nor supervised release have functioned as freestanding sentences. 
In this respect, both parole and supervised release have been alternatives to probation, 
the institution used for subjecting individuals to supervision without their necessarily 
having first served time in confinement.35 Also like parole, individuals on supervised 
release are subject to a variety of requirements upon which their continued freedom is 
conditioned. The basic structural difference is that in supervised release individuals 
 
30 Id. at 1017–18. 
31 McClendon, supra note 12, at 182. 
32 Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, § 212(a)(2), 18 U.S.C. § 3583(a). 
33 Doherty, supra note 29, at 959–60, 995. 
34 Scott-Hayward, supra note 20, at 196. 
35 Doherty, supra note 29, at 998. 
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are subjected to a period of conditional liberty after completion of the initial prison 
term.36 Apart from the possibility of relatively small reductions for good behavior, 
individuals serve the entire initial prison term. This is the feature of the new system 
that was supposed to address the excessive indeterminacy that plagued the parole 
system.37 Moreover, since a term of supervised release is something that a judge may 
impose as an additional part of the sentence to follow completion of the prescribed 
prison term,38 it may be tailored to the particular circumstances of the individual 
defendant rather than being tied simply to the length of the initial prison term.39 In 
response to criticisms of parole’s reliance on quasi-judicial bodies based in the 
executive branch, another change affected by the new system was that it moved 
oversight of released individuals to the judiciary. 
The statutory provisions introducing supervised release at the federal level were 
part of a larger package of congressional legislation—the Comprehensive Crime 
Control Act of 1984—that instituted broader changes in criminal justice.40 Those 
broader changes included the establishment of the United States Sentencing 
Commission, which was charged with producing guidelines to be used by judges in 
determining sentences in particular cases.41 Within the outer ranges of penalties called 
for by existing criminal law, the guidelines produced by the Sentencing Commission 
provided criteria establishing narrower ranges for judges to use in fixing sentences.42 
Under this new sentencing system, along with setting the length of the prison term that 
an individual would serve, judges were also authorized to impose periods of 
supervised release to be served following release from prison.43 For some offenses, a 
minimum term of supervised release is required by statute.44 In other cases, judges 
have discretion to impose terms of supervised release up to the statutorily provided 
maximum.45 In making a determination about supervised release, judges are instructed 
to consider a range of factors, including, for instance, the nature of the offense and the 
defendant’s record.46 However, one factor that judges are specifically prohibited from 
considering is the need to impose on defendants the just punishment they deserve for 
 
36 Id. at 997. 
37 Id. at 996. 
38 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3583(a). 
39 Scott-Hayward, supra note 20, at 190. 
40 McClendon, supra note 12, at 181–82, 181 n.43. 
41 Scott-Hayward, supra note 20, at 190. 
42 Id. at 193. 
43 Johnson v. United States, 529 U.S. 694, 696–97 (2000). 
44 Scott-Hayward, supra note 20, at 192. 
45 Id. 
46 Id. at 193. 
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having engaged in the criminal activity.47 The rationale for this proscription is that the 
guiding aim of supervised release is not to punish perpetrators, but rather, to pave the 
way for their reintegration into society.48 
Some of the conditions imposed on individuals during their supervised release are 
mandatory for particular offenses, while others may be imposed at the judge’s 
discretion depending on the details of particular cases.49 The Sentencing Guidelines 
established by the Sentencing Commission speak not only to terms of imprisonment 
but also to the imposition of supervised release. In cases involving felonies, for 
instance, the Guidelines call for at least one year of supervised release, and they 
recommend certain standard conditions governing matters such as the people with 
whom defendants may associate.50 Judges also have discretion to impose a wide range 
of other conditions, ranging from the submission of DNA samples to travel 
restrictions, curfews, and limitations on the defendant’s place of employment.51 
A crucial similarity with parole is that individuals on supervised release may be 
re-imprisoned for violating the conditions of their liberty without being afforded the 
usual constitutional protections of a criminal trial. This was not the intention from the 
beginning. Since the purpose of supervised release was rehabilitation rather than 
punishment—and supervised release was supposed to operate very differently from 
parole—the language of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 required a conventional 
prosecution before re-imprisoning an individual on supervised release.52 Thus, under 
the system as initially conceived, the government would have to use contempt of court 
as a remedy for individuals who violated the conditions of their release, which required 
the government to prove its allegations to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.53 Before 
the legislation took effect, however, intervening legislation (the Anti-Drug Abuse Act 
of 1986) made a critical change: individuals on supervised release could be re-
imprisoned—potentially for longer periods of time than was remaining on their term 
of supervised release—based on nothing more than the finding of a judge by a 
preponderance of the evidence that the defendant had violated conditions of release.54 
Later legislation (in 1994) allowed judges upon revocation to add new terms of 
supervised release, in some cases even for the rest of the defendant’s life.55  
While defendants at revocation hearings enjoy some procedural protections, such 
as the rights to counsel, to testify on direct examination, and to be apprised of the 




49 Johnson v. United States, 529 U.S. 624, 696–97 (2000). 
50 Scott-Hayward, supra note 20, at 192, 196–97. 
51 Id. at 193, 197. 
52 Id. at 190. 
53 Id. at 191. 
54 Doherty, supra note 29, at 1000–03. 
55 Id. at 1003–04. 
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a criminal trial. Not only are they denied the right to a jury and the “beyond a 
reasonable doubt” evidentiary standard, defendants at revocation hearings also do not 
enjoy the protections of the exclusionary rule,56 the privilege against self-
incrimination,57 or the Federal Rules of Evidence.58 Moreover, they are denied the 
protection of the right not to be prosecuted twice for the same offense, which means 
that defendants who have their supervised release revoked for acts that constitute 
crimes may also be subject to a separate criminal prosecution.59 The position of 
individuals in revocation hearings to mount a defense is also weakened by the 
deprivation of rights that would normally apply prior to the stage at which the 
prosecution presents its case. For instance, the conditions attached to supervised 
release often include provisions allowing supervising officers to conduct searches 
without procuring a warrant or establishing probable cause.60 
III. JUSTIFICATIONS FOR THE DIMINISHED RIGHTS OF INDIVIDUALS ON 
SUPERVISED RELEASE 
Despite the differences between parole and supervised release, we have seen that 
there are many similarities. An especially significant thread of continuity concerns the 
possibility that an individual may be re-imprisoned without anything close to the 
normal procedural protections associated with a criminal trial. While sending 
individuals to prison—potentially for long periods of time, and even up to terms of 
life—without a jury trial or other constitutional protections, might seem extraordinary, 
the practice has, in fact, long been sanctioned by the Supreme Court. In this Part, we 
consider the reasoning that the Court has used to uphold the practice.  
As we will see, the crucial idea in the Court’s reasoning has been the drawing of a 
distinction between the imposition of a sentence, on the one hand, and developments 
that are part of the administration of a sentence already imposed, on the other. It is 
uncontroversial that before the government imposes a new criminal sentence, it must 
provide defendants with the full panoply of procedural protections guaranteed by the 
U.S. Constitution. According to the Justices’ reasoning, however, the revocation of 
supervised release does not amount to the imposition of a new criminal sentence. 
Rather, the Justices have reasoned, the revocation of supervised release should be 
understood as a stage in the carrying out of a sentence previously established. If a 
sentence is imposed only one time, then the government must afford the full panoply 
of constitutional protections only once.  
 
56 The Supreme Court has long held that evidence acquired in violation of the Constitution 
may not be used to convict defendants in criminal cases. Weeks v. United States, 282 U.S. 383, 
398 (1914). 
57 The Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution provides that: “No person shall be . . . 
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself . . . .” U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
58 Harold Baer, Jr., The Alpha & Omega of Supervised Release, 60 ALB. L. REV. 267, 288 
(1996). 
59 The Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution provides that: “No person shall be . . . 
subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb.” U.S. CONST. amend. V; 
see Scott-Hayward, supra note 20, at 203–04. 
60 Scott-Hayward, supra note 20, at 202–03. 
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A. Morrissey v. Brewer 
Ironically, the most significant decision in which the Court articulated the 
justification underlying the diminished rights of parolees—Morrissey v. Brewer61—
was one that set limits on the revocation of parole. By the time of that decision, the 
notion that parolees did not enjoy the constitutional rights normally associated with a 
criminal trial was so deeply entrenched that the defendants in the case did not even 
advance the argument that they should have been granted a jury trial.62 Instead, the 
issue before the Court was whether parolees were entitled to any kind of hearing at all 
before being returned to prison for violating the conditions of their release.63 
The named defendant, John Morrissey, had been convicted on charges of issuing 
fraudulent checks and sentenced to a maximum prison term of seven years.64 The 
parole board released Morrissey during the second year of imprisonment, but revoked 
his parole seven months later.65 The board’s decision to revoke was based on the parole 
officer’s report that Morrissey had violated the terms of his release in a number of 
ways, including: purchasing a car under an assumed name; operating the car without 
permission; giving false statements to police following a minor vehicular accident; 
and failing to disclose his place of residence to his parole officer.66 The lower courts 
in the case held that there was no constitutional deficiency in the parole board’s 
decision to revoke Morrissey’s parole based on nothing more than the parole officer’s 
report.67 The Constitution, they held, did not entitle the defendant to any kind of 
hearing before his parole could be revoked.68 The Supreme Court overturned the lower 
courts, declaring that parolees were entitled to a hearing before being returned to 
prison.69 At the same time, the Justices had little difficulty in concluding that parolees 
were not entitled to the rights associated with a jury trial. 
Courts often confront questions about which procedural rights apply in various 
contexts, since not every instance in which public officials render decisions impacting 
the liberty or interests of individuals brings into play the full panoply of procedural 
protections described in the Constitution. The Sixth Amendment guarantees that: “In 
all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, 
by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been 
committed . . . ; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; . . . and to have the 
 
61 Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 488–89 (1972). 
62 See Brief for Petitioner at 8, Morrissey, 408 U.S. 471 (No. 71-5103). 
63 Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 472. 
64 Id. 
65 Id. 
66 Id. at 472–73. 
67 Id. at 474. 
68 Id. at 474–75. 
69  Id. at 489. 
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Assistance of Counsel for his defense.”70 Not every encounter with government power 
implicates all of these rights because not every encounter with government power is a 
criminal prosecution. Even when not being criminally prosecuted, though, individuals 
may nevertheless be entitled to certain procedural protections. The basis of such rights 
is the Due Process Clause, which guarantees that: “No person shall be . . . deprived of 
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law. . . .”71 To determine which 
procedural protections apply in a particular context, the Supreme Court has long held 
that courts must engage in a balancing analysis that takes into account the interests 
both of the individual and of the government.72 
Morrissey is best known for the Court’s application of a balancing analysis under 
the Due Process Clause to determine that parole could not be revoked without any 
kind of hearing at all.73 In conducting that balancing analysis, Chief Justice Warren 
Burger’s opinion for the Court acknowledged the considerable liberty interests at stake 
for the parolee:  
The liberty of a parolee enables him to do a wide range of things open to 
persons who have never been convicted of any crime. The parolee has been 
released from prison based on an evaluation that he shows reasonable 
promise of being able to return to society and function as a responsible, self-
reliant person. Subject to the conditions of his parole, he can be gainfully 
employed and is free to be with family and friends and to form the other 
enduring attachments of normal life. Though the State properly subjects him 
to many restrictions not applicable to other citizens, his condition is very 
different from that of confinement in a prison. He may have been on parole 
for a number of years and may be living a relatively normal life at the time 
he is faced with revocation. The parolee has relied on at least an implicit 
promise that parole will be revoked only if he fails to live up to the parole 
conditions. In many cases, the parolee faces lengthy incarceration if his 
parole is revoked. We see, therefore, that the liberty of a parolee, although 
indeterminate, includes many of the core values of unqualified liberty and its 
termination inflicts a ‘grievous loss’ on the parolee and often on others.74  
Thus, the Court recognized that parolees have a strong interest in receiving some 
kind of process beyond the mere filing of a report by the parole officer. At the same 
time, the Court also stressed the government’s interest in being able to revoke parole 
without having to provide parolees with overly burdensome procedural protections. In 
this vein, Chief Justice Burger wrote: 
 
70 U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
71 This is language of the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
The Fourteenth Amendment—applicable against the state governments rather than the federal 
government—similarly guarantees that: “No state . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law.” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
72 Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262–63 (1970). 
73 Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 481–84. 
74 Id. at 482. 
12https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol69/iss3/6
2021]      RE-IMPRISONMENT WITHOUT A JURY TRIAL  581 
The State has found the parolee guilty of a crime against the people. That 
finding justifies imposing extensive restrictions on the individual’s liberty. 
Release of the parolee before the end of his prison sentence is made with the 
recognition that with many prisoners there is a risk that they will not be able 
to live in society without committing additional antisocial acts. Given the 
previous conviction and the proper imposition of conditions, the State has an 
overwhelming interest in being able to return the individual to imprisonment 
without the burden of a new adversary criminal trial if in fact he has failed to 
abide by the conditions of his parole.75 
Taking into account the interests of both the parolee and the government, the Court 
concluded that the parolee was entitled to an “effective but informal hearing.”76 More 
specifically, the Court held that parolees were entitled, first, to a preliminary hearing, 
and then to a revocation hearing.77 The preliminary hearing would entail a minimal 
inquiry shortly after arrest “to determine whether there is probable cause or reasonable 
ground to believe that the arrested parolee has committed acts that would constitute a 
violation of parole conditions.”78 At the preliminary hearing, the defendant was 
entitled to notice of the basis for the government’s pursuit of revocation and an 
opportunity to be heard.79 The hearing officer—who could be a parole officer, though 
not the one directly involved in the case under litigation—was required to provide a 
summary of the information that was the basis for holding the individual until the 
revocation hearing.80 Within a reasonable time following the preliminary hearing—
the Court did not fix a minimum period but indicated that two months would normally 
be a reasonable time frame—the defendant was entitled to a revocation hearing at 
which he would be afforded such rights as “written notice of the claimed violations of 
parole”; “disclosure to the parolee of evidence against him”; an opportunity to present 
evidence; and “a neutral and detached hearing body such as a traditional parole board, 
members of which need not be judicial officers or lawyers.”81 
While the Court’s refusal to allow the revocation of parole without a hearing was 
undoubtedly significant, the aspect of the decision with greatest salience for the 
present discussion was the ease with which the Court concluded that parolees were 
not entitled to a jury trial. The Court’s detailed balancing analysis was sandwiched 
between insistences that parolees were clearly not entitled to jury trials before having 
their parole revoked. Before commencing its weighing of individual and government 
interests, Chief Justice Burger wrote: “We begin with the proposition that the 
revocation of parole is not part of a criminal prosecution and thus the full panoply of 
 
75 Id. at 483. 
76 Id. at 485. 
77 Id. at 485, 488. 
78 Id. at 485. 
79 Id. at 486–87. 
80 Id. at 485–87. 
81 Id. at 488–89. 
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rights due a defendant in such a proceeding does not apply to parole revocations.”82 
Although the Court’s discussion on the point was brief, it made clear that the 
unavailability of the full panoply of rights to parolees rested on two critical 
distinctions. The first distinction was one already noted: that between the imposition 
of a sentence, and its administration. If the revocation of parole constituted the 
imposition of a new sentence, then it would bring with it the full panoply of procedural 
protections. In the Court’s view, however, the revocation of parole merely represented 
one development among many in the long course of events amounting to the 
administration of a sentence already imposed.83  
The second critical distinction was that between absolute and conditional liberty. 
Absolute liberty was the liberty “to which every citizen is entitled”; this was the kind 
of liberty enjoyed by all those who had not been convicted of crimes.84 By contrast, 
parolees enjoyed only a “conditional liberty properly dependent on observance of 
special parole restrictions.”85 The two distinctions were interrelated. The first 
distinction meant that parolees had already been afforded the full panoply of rights, 
and, having been convicted, already had a sentence imposed. The second distinction 
meant that part of the sentence imposed entailed a loss of liberty. Consequently, 
parolees did not have as much at stake at a revocation hearing. The revocation of 
parole did not entail a deprivation of absolute liberty because parolees had already lost 
that kind of liberty when the sentencing court rendered its judgment.86  
B. Johnson v. United States 
Unlike parolees, individuals on supervised release have completed their prison 
terms. This means that defendants who have their supervised release revoked are not 
being returned to prison to complete a part of their initial prison term. Rather, 
supervised release constitutes a separate component of a criminal sentence. The 
maximum time that one may serve in prison following revocation of supervised release 
is not fixed by the initial prison term, since that initial prison term has already been 
fulfilled. In Johnson v. United States, however, the Court declined to find 
constitutional significance in this difference in the structure of parole and supervised 
release.87 As in Morrissey, the Court in Johnson based its reasoning in the distinction 
between the imposition and administration of a sentence.88 According to the Court, the 
revocation of supervised release—like the revocation of parole—was best understood 
 





87 Johnson v. United States, 529 U.S. 694, 696–97 (2000). 
88 See generally id. 
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not as the imposition of a new sentence, but as a later development arising in the course 
of administering a sentence already imposed.89 
The immediate issue before the Court in Johnson concerned not the Sixth 
Amendment’s right to a jury trial, but the Ex Post Facto Clause, set forth in Article I, 
Section 9 of the Constitution (“No . . . ex post facto Law shall be passed.”).90 Upon 
being convicted on charges of participating in a conspiracy to commit credit card fraud 
in 1993, Cornell Johnson was sentenced to a prison term to be followed by three years 
of supervised release.91 In 1994, after completing the prison term, Johnson had his 
supervised release revoked based on allegations that he had engaged in acts of 
forgery.92 In addition to a prison term, the district court imposed an additional term of 
twelve months of supervised release following Johnson’s release from prison.93 At the 
time of Johnson’s original offense in 1993, the existing legislation did not explicitly 
authorize judges to impose new terms of supervised release when revoking an initial 
term of supervised release. On appeal, Johnson contended that this imposition of a 
new term of supervised release amounted to the unconstitutional application of an ex 
post facto law.94  
However, between the time of Johnson’s original sentence and the time of the acts 
for which his supervised release was revoked in 1994, Congress had enacted 
legislation unambiguously authorizing courts to impose new terms of supervised 
release upon revoking a previous term of supervised release. The Sixth Circuit Court 
of Appeals upheld the district court on the grounds that its revocation order imposed 
a new punishment on Johnson.95 If the revocation order was a new punishment, then 
the imposition of an additional term of supervised release was authorized by the 
recently enacted congressional legislation, which took effect prior to the acts that were 
the cause for the revocation.96 
With respect to the immediate dispute, the Sixth Circuit’s ruling favored the 
government, since it rejected Johnson’s challenge to the district court’s imposition of 
a new term of supervised release.97 Nevertheless, the Sixth Circuit’s reasoning had 
far-reaching implications that the government did not view so favorably. The Supreme 
Court’s earlier conclusion in Morrissey that parolees were not entitled to jury trials 
had hinged on the critical move of viewing the revocation of parole as nothing more 
than the administration of a sentence already imposed. This idea was pivotal because 
if the revocation of parole instead amounted to the imposition of a new prison term, 
 
89 Id. at 700. 
90 Id. at 696. 
91 Id. at 697. 
92 Id. 
93 Id. at 698. 
94 Id. 
95 Id. at 698–99. 
96 Id. 
97 United States v. Johnson, No. 98-5664, 1999 WL 282679, at *1 (6th Cir. Apr. 29, 1999). 
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then parolees would have to be recognized as the accused in a criminal prosecution, 
thereby bringing into play the complete array of constitutional protections. Now, in 
Johnson, if the Sixth Circuit was right that revocation should be viewed as punishment 
for actions that individuals committed while on supervised release—rather than as part 
of the administration of the initial sentence—then this would mean that defendants at 
revocation hearings would be entitled to the full panoply of rights associated with 
criminal trials. The Sixth Circuit’s reasoning, if accepted, would block the Court from 
applying the reasoning it used in Morrissey to the context of supervised release. Aware 
of these implications, on appeal to the Supreme Court, the government disowned the 
Sixth Circuit’s line of reasoning, arguing that the district court’s ruling should be 
upheld on other grounds.98 
In Johnson, the Supreme Court granted the government what it sought both with 
respect to Johnson’s particular case and with respect to the larger issues raised by the 
case. It found alternative grounds for denying Johnson’s Ex Post Facto Clause 
challenge (including that earlier congressional legislation, enacted prior even to 
Johnson’s initial sentence, had already effectively authorized the imposition of new 
terms of supervised release).99 Of much broader significance, the Justices also rejected 
the Sixth Circuit’s understanding of supervised release. In his opinion for the Court, 
Justice David Souter focused on what the implications would be of accepting the Sixth 
Circuit’s reasoning. Indeed, Justice Souter articulated a justification for treating the 
revocation of supervised release as punishment for the original offense that depended 
entirely on what it saw as the undesirable consequences of failing to do so.100 In effect, 
the Court treated the diminished constitutional rights of individuals on supervised 
release as a fixed premise around which all other reasoning would have to be fitted. 
Thus, in a remarkably terse statement addressing the (diminished) procedural 
protections for individuals on supervised release at revocation hearings, Justice Souter 
wrote:  
While [the Sixth Circuit’s] understanding of revocation of supervised release 
has some intuitive appeal, the Government disavows it, and wisely so in view 
of the serious constitutional questions that would be raised by construing 
revocation and re-imprisonment as punishment for the violation of the 
conditions of supervised release. Although such violations often lead to re-
imprisonment, the violative conduct need not be criminal and need only be 
found by a judge under a preponderance of the evidence standard, not by a 
jury beyond a reasonable doubt. Where the acts of violation are criminal in 
their own right, they may be the basis for separate prosecution, which would 
raise an issue of double jeopardy if the revocation of supervised release were 
also punishment for the same offense. Treating postrevocation sanctions as 
part of the penalty for the initial offense, however (as most courts have done), 
avoids these difficulties.101  
 
98 Johnson, 529 U.S. at 700. 
99 Id. at 704–07. 
100 Id. at 700. 
101 Id. 
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In other words, recognizing revocation of supervised release as the imposition of 
a new punishment would mean that the practice of affording dramatically diminished 
rights to individuals would violate numerous constitutional protections. The unstated 
premise driving Justice Souter’s reasoning was that such a result was plainly 
unacceptable. Since adopting the Sixth Circuit’s reasoning would lead to this 
(unacceptable) result, it had to be incorrect. Accordingly, the Court made explicit that 
individuals on supervised release could be re-imprisoned without being afforded the 
right to a jury trial and other rights normally provided at criminal trials. 
C. United States v. Haymond 
Following Johnson, almost two decades passed before the Court, in United States 
v. Haymond, revisited the question of whether individuals were entitled to a jury trial 
before having their supervised release revoked.102 For two major reasons, the 
implications of Haymond for the rights of individuals on supervised release are less 
clear than they were in Johnson. First, Haymond did not yield a majority opinion, and 
second, Haymond set some (though, as we will see, quite limited) limitations on the 
government’s ability to revoke supervised release without a jury trial.103 Despite 
disagreements on the Court regarding certain issues in Haymond, however, all of the 
Justices accepted certain basic assumptions which have long undergirded the 
justification for according diminished rights to individuals convicted of crimes after 
they are freed from prison. 
Upon being convicted on charges of possession of child pornography, Andre 
Haymond was sentenced to a 38-month prison term, to be followed by ten years of 
supervised release.104 The crime for which Haymond was convicted provided for a 
range of prison time between zero and ten years and a term of supervised release 
between five years and life.105 While Haymond was on supervised release, the 
government sought his re-imprisonment based on allegations that he had been found 
once again in the possession of child pornography.106 After an evidentiary hearing, the 
district court judge found for the government.107 On appeal, Haymond did not 
challenge the system of supervised release as a whole, but rather, a statutory provision 
that directly and significantly impacted his case: 18 U.S.C. § 3583(k).108 In the absence 
of this provision, the district court judge would have exercised discretion in sentencing 
Haymond to a term of imprisonment between zero and two years. In 2006, however, 
as part of the Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act, Congress enacted § 
3583(k), requiring the judge in a case like Haymond’s to impose a term of at least five 
 
102 United States v. Haymond, 139 S. Ct. 2369, 2375 (2019). 
103 Id. at 2371, 2378–79. 
104 Id. at 2373. 
105 Id. 
106 Id. at 2374. 
107 Id. 
108 Id. at 2375. 
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years (and up to a term of life).109 The provision applied in cases where an individual 
who was required to register as a sex offender committed a crime punishable by more 
than one year in prison.110 On appeal, Haymond claimed that § 3583(k) violated the 
Fifth and Sixth Amendments by subjecting him to a new sentence without a jury 
trial.111 The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals agreed, as did a majority of the Justices.112 
By finding § 3583(k) unconstitutional as applied in Haymond’s case, the Court set 
limitations on the extent to which individuals on supervised release could be re-
imprisoned without a jury trial. Nevertheless, examination of the Court’s reasoning 
reveals that, notwithstanding their disagreements, the Court as a whole kept intact the 
basic assumptions that have long justified the government in providing only second-
tier rights to individuals who are under some kind of supervision following release 
from prison. Thus, it is vital to recognize the extent of the agreement among the 
Justices in Haymond. Most significantly, Justice Gorsuch’s plurality opinion, like 
Justice Alito’s dissenting opinion, accepted the basic approach that the Court had long 
used to uphold the extension of only second-tier rights to individuals on parole or 
supervised release. Indeed, the reasoning on which the plurality relied to invalidate § 
3583(k) depended on that crucial distinction between the imposition and 
administration of a sentence.113 As Justice Gorsuch wrote: “The defendant receives a 
term of supervised release thanks to his initial offense, and whether that release is later 
revoked or sustained, it constitutes a part of the final sentence for his crime.”114 
In an opinion written by Justice Alito, the four dissenting Justices found it easy to 
conclude that Haymond’s constitutional challenge lacked merit. 115 According to the 
dissent, nothing more was required to decide Haymond than a straightforward 
application of the same reasoning that earlier Justices had used to justify the 
affordance of only second-tier rights to parolees.116 In Justice Alito’s view, the Court’s 
precedents in Morrissey and Johnson were enough to decide the case.117 As discussed 
above, Morrissey employed the distinction between the imposition and administration 
of a sentence to explain why parolees were not entitled to jury trials before being re-
imprisoned.118 Justice Alito asserted that the same distinction applied to individuals 
 
109 Id. at 2374–75. 
110 Id. at 2374 n.1. 
111 Id. at 2375. 
112 Id. at 2371, 2375, 2385 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
113 Id. at 2380 (plurality opinion). 
114 Id. 
115 Id. at 2386–2400 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
116 Id. at 2393–94. 
117 Id. at 2394. 
118 Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972). 
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on supervised release.119 Drawing on the Court’s reasoning in Morrissey, Justice Alito 
maintained that revocation of supervised release had to be understood not as 
punishment for a new offense, but rather, as part of the ongoing administration of the 
punishment for the initial offense.120 According to this line of reasoning, when 
individuals on supervised release received penalties following revocation hearings, 
they were not being punished for newly committed offenses. Instead, the “principal 
reason for assigning a penalty to a supervised-release violation is . . . that the violative 
act is a breach of trust.”121 Thus, even when the allegations leading to revocation of 
supervised release were criminal in nature, the defendant was “charged not with a 
crime, but with violating the terms of a jury-authorized sentence that flowed from his 
original conviction.”122 Justice Alito argued that this justification for re-imprisonment 
without a jury trial, transplanted from the context of parole, had no less force in the 
context of supervised release.123 He also emphasized just how far this line of reasoning 
reached: even a defendant subjected to a relatively brief prison term at the initial 
sentence could be subjected to a long term of re-imprisonment without a jury trial.124 
As Justice Alito put the point: “No matter what penalties flow from the revocation of 
parole . . . the related proceedings are not part of the criminal prosecution.”125 
The central difference between the plurality and dissenting Justices concerned the 
former’s view that a line of cases tracing to Apprendi v. New Jersey126 applied to 
Haymond’s case. Apprendi arose as a judicial response to an important development 
in sentencing policy that had been implemented in the 1980s. In particular, legislatures 
had adopted a bifurcated approach to sentencing.127 Following the return of a guilty 
verdict, judges engaged in a second phase during which they considered factors 
bearing on an appropriate punishment before determining the sentence.128 The practice 
was rendered potentially problematic when legislators began authorizing judges to 
increase sentences based on particular findings regarding the nature of the defendant’s 
criminal behavior. These “sentencing enhancement” provisions raised constitutional 
questions because they increased the possible range of penalties based on findings that 
 
119 Haymond, 139 S. Ct. at 2394 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
120 Id. at 2393–94. 
121 Id. at 2393. 
122 Id. 
123 Id. at 2394. 
124 Id. 
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126 Id. at 2379; Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 468 (2000). 
127 McClendon, supra note 12, at 189. 
128 Id. 
19Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2021
588 CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [69:569 
did not have to be established in accordance with the same procedural protections 
associated with the phase of the trial aimed at determining guilt.129 
The defendant in Apprendi was convicted on charges of unlawfully possessing a 
firearm.130 In itself, that conviction subjected Charles Apprendi to a prison term of 
five to ten years.131 However, under New Jersey’s hate crime law, Apprendi would be 
subject to a term of ten to twenty years if he was found to have committed the 
underlying crime “with a purpose to intimidate an individual or group of individuals 
because of race, color, gender, handicap, religion, sexual orientation or ethnicity.”132 
Crucially, while the underlying offense had to be proven “beyond a reasonable doubt” 
to a jury, the facts giving rise to the sentencing enhancement only had to be 
demonstrated to a judge by a “preponderance of the evidence.”133 Finding that the 
sentencing enhancement applied, the judge in Apprendi’s case sentenced him to a 
twelve-year prison term, which was more than the maximum to which he could have 
been subjected in the absence of the sentencing enhancement.134 The Court invalidated 
the state’s sentencing enhancement scheme, declaring: “Other than the fact of a prior 
conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed 
statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable 
doubt.”135 Courts had long held the prosecution to the burden of proving every element 
of a charged offense beyond a reasonable doubt.136 What Apprendi declared was that 
this requirement also applied to features of a crime that had the effect of increasing 
the penalties to which a defendant was subjected.137  
While Apprendi applied to features of a crime that increased the maximum sentence 
to which a defendant could be subjected, in Alleyne v. United States,138 the Court 
applied the same reasoning 13 years later to features of a crime that increased the 
minimum sentence. Overruling its contrary conclusion in Harris v. United States,139 
Alleyne established that features of a crime that increased the floor of the punishment 
brought into play the same constitutional protections applicable to features of a crime 
raising the ceiling.140 As Justice Thomas wrote in his opinion for the majority: 
 
129 Id. at 190. 
130 Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 469. 
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132 Id. at 468–69. 
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137 Id. at 468–83.  
138 Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99, 103 (2013).  
139 Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545, 568–69 (2002).   
140 Alleyne, 570 U.S. at 103.  
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Any fact that, by law, increases the penalty for a crime is an “element” that 
must be submitted to the jury and found beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Mandatory minimum sentences increase the penalty for a crime. It follows, 
then, that any fact that increases the mandatory minimum is an “element” that 
must be submitted to the jury.141 
The difference between facts increasing the maximum or the minimum did not 
make a constitutional difference because “[b]oth kinds of facts alter the prescribed 
range of sentences to which a defendant is exposed and do so in a manner that 
aggravates the punishment.”142 
Because the statute at issue in Haymond imposed a mandatory minimum sentence, 
it was Alleyne in particular that the plurality stressed in defending its decision to 
invalidate § 3583(k).143 To find Alleyne applicable, the plurality had to embrace the 
view of revocation as tying back to the initial sentence, rather than as imposing a new 
sentence. Justice Gorsuch’s reasoning was that the minimum sentence mandated by § 
3583(k) altered the range of penalties to which Haymond was subject.144 
Notwithstanding the passage of substantial time between the initial sentence and the 
revocation hearing, the analogy with a mandatory term imposed at the time of the 
initial sentence held firm.145 In the plurality’s view, the passage of time did not alter 
the essential nature of § 3583(k).146 What it effected was clear: it altered the prescribed 
range of sentence to which Haymond was exposed, and it did so in a way that 
aggravated the punishment. In particular, instead of having the possibility of being 
sentenced to no prison time at all—which would have been the case in the absence of 
§ 3583(k)—the statute subjected Haymond to a minimum sentence of five years. In 
light of this clear change in the prescribed range of penalties, the plurality reasoned, 
Haymond was entitled to have the facts supporting the finding of guilt proven to a jury 
beyond a reasonable doubt, as required by the Fifth and Sixth Amendments.147 
In relying on Alleyne to invalidate § 3583(k), the plurality stressed that it was 
accepting the Court’s longstanding view that the revocation of supervised release did 
not constitute punishment for a new offense.148 Insisting that the opinion did nothing 
more than apply existing doctrines, Justice Gorsuch wrote that “an accused’s final 
sentence includes any supervised release sentence he may receive.”149 Thus, the 
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plurality opinion was not “say[ing] anything new.”150 Crucially, the plurality and 
dissenting Justices were in agreement that revocation did not represent punishment for 
a new offense. The question on which they disagreed was whether revocation should 
be seen as an extension of the initial sentencing or merely a facet of the administration 
of a sentence that was already finally determined. Since the plurality saw revocation 
as an extension of the sentencing linked to the initial trial, it brought with it 
constitutional protections associated with that phase of the proceedings. By contrast, 
the dissent considered the determination of the initial sentence to be completed and 
closed at the time of the initial sentencing, which brought to an end the period when 
those constitutional protections applied.151 Whether or not the dissenting Justices were 
right to fear the positions that the plurality Justices might adopt in future cases,152 the 
plurality’s reasoning did not overthrow the basic assumptions on which the Court’s 
approach to revocation hearings have rested up to this point.  
To be sure, in contrast to Justice Alito’s dissenting opinion—which emphasized 
the similarities between parole and supervised release153—the plurality’s reasoning 
noted a distinction between parole and supervised release. But the role that this 
distinction played in Justice Gorsuch’s opinion was effectively to note that the 
particular issue before the Court in Haymond just could not have arisen in the context 
of parole. After all, in the parole system, the sentencing judge set the range of prison 
time that defendant might serve, leaving the possibility of early release up to the parole 
board. Consequently, parole revocation hearings simply did not entail the possibility 
that the range of possible penalties could be altered at the revocation hearing. By 
contrast, in the current system, the defendant completes the prison term imposed at the 
initial sentence before beginning the term of supervised release. This means that the 
revocation of supervised release can result in the defendant serving more prison time 
than was prescribed at the time of the initial sentence. What the plurality found 
unacceptable about § 3583(k) was that its mandatory minimum altered the range of 
prison time to which the defendant was subject, an outcome that would have been 
precluded under a parole system by its very structure.154 The important point is that 
the distinction that the plurality drew between parole and supervised release did not 
upset the longstanding assumption that in both systems the government’s attempt to 
re-imprison defendants did not amount to the imposition of a new sentence. 
In his concurring opinion, Justice Breyer indicated that he largely agreed with the 
understanding of the revocation of supervised release adopted in Justice Alito’s 
dissenting opinion.155 In nevertheless deeming § 3583(k) unconstitutional, Justice 
Breyer identified two key problems with the provision’s mandatory minimum 
sentence: it picked out specific crimes that triggered its application, and it interfered 
 
150 Id. 
151 Id. at 2395 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
152 Id. 
153 See id. at 2391. 
154 Id. at 2381–82 (plurality opinion). 
155 Id. at 2385 (Breyer, J., concurring).  
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with judicial discretion.156 While Justice Breyer’s brief opinion did not spell out the 
basis for its conclusion in the same detail as the plurality and dissenting opinions, we 
can best understand its reasoning by recalling the roots of the practice of re-
imprisoning individuals without jury trials. As we have seen, that practice has 
depended on a rehabilitative conception of conditional liberty. The goal of overseeing 
individuals conditionally released from prison is to reform and reintegrate them into 
society. When individuals violate the conditions of release, they breach the trust that 
was placed in them. Re-imprisonment constitutes a response to that breach of trust, 
not a new punishment for the commission of a particular crime. It is this conception 
of supervised release that underlies the notion that re-imprisonment amounts to the 
administration of an existing sentence rather than the imposition of a new one. Justice 
Breyer’s opinion seemed to express the view that § 3583(k) could not be made to 
plausibly fit with this model. A rehabilitative framework depends on the judge holding 
discretion to fit consequences to a particular defendant’s situation, rather than 
imposing mandatory sentences. Moreover, § 3583(k)’s selection of particular crimes 
for mandatory minimum punishments suggested that its real focus was not so much 
on rehabilitation as it was on punishing crimes seen as presenting an especially 
pressing societal problem. It is notable in this respect that the provision challenged in 
Haymond was not enacted as part of a bill principally geared toward improving the 
system of supervised release. Rather, as stated in the legislation’s preamble, the Adam 
Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act (of which § 3583(k) constituted only a 
relatively small portion) was designed to “protect children from sexual exploitation 
and violent crime” and “to prevent child abuse and child pornography . . . .”157 Again, 
the most important point for our purposes is that Justice Breyer, like the rest of the 
Court, did not challenge the pivotal distinction between the imposition and 
administration of a sentence in justifying the practice of re-imprisonment without a 
jury trial. His objection was not to the general framework that the Court has long 
applied, but to the challenged statute’s failure to fit neatly within that framework. 
IV. THE UNJUSTIFIABILITY OF RE-IMPRISONMENT WITHOUT A JURY TRIAL 
In this Part, we turn from description of the justification that the Court has offered 
for the practice of re-imprisonment without a jury trial to criticism of that justification. 
The linchpin of the justification has been to conceive of the revocation of supervised 
release as part of the punishment for the original offense, rather than as punishment 
for a new offense. If revocation does not constitute punishment for a new offense, 
then, under well-established constitutional doctrines, individuals on supervised release 
are not entitled to the full panoply of procedural protections associated with a criminal 
trial. But what if the claim that revocation does not constitute punishment for a new 
offense is exposed as an unwarranted legal fiction? If the claim is not valid, then we 
must recognize that a large population of individuals conducting full lives outside of 
prison are being systematically deprived of the most basic constitutional protections. 
It is vital to recognize what is at stake in assessing the justification for re-
imprisonment without a jury trial. The practice has been widely accepted for so long 
that it may be easy to overlook how remarkable it is. Ordinarily, we take it for granted 
 
156 Id. at 2386. 
157 Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act, Pub. L. No. 109-248, 120 Stat. 587 (2006). 
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that individuals are entitled to the full panoply of procedural rights guaranteed by the 
Constitution. One of the most cherished of these is the right to a jury trial for those 
accused of a crime. The Sixth Amendment’s guarantee that the accused in “all criminal 
prosecutions shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury” 
embodies a commitment to liberty and self-government.158 No exercise of 
governmental power more immediately restricts individual liberty than a prosecution 
resulting in imprisonment. One of the ways that the Constitution sets bounds on the 
exercise of that power is by placing the judgment of the people—in the form of a jury 
verdict—between the government and the individual charged with a crime.  
Another one of the most familiar and cherished rights is that the government has 
the burden of proving every element of a charged offense “beyond a reasonable 
doubt.”159 Although this right is not stated explicitly in the Constitution, the Supreme 
Court has long recognized it as implicit in the Fifth Amendment’s guarantee that “[n]o 
person shall be . . . deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”160 
In the 1968 decision declaring this as a firmly entrenched constitutional right—In re 
Winship—the Court explained the indispensability of this right in protecting 
individual liberty.161 Justice William Brennan’s opinion for the Court emphasized the 
stakes for a defendant in a criminal trial, the power differential between the defendant 
and the prosecution, and the role that the “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard has in 
protecting individuals from erroneous convictions.162 As Justice Brennan noted, the 
defendant “has at stake interest[s] of immense importance, both because of the 
possibility that he may lose his liberty upon conviction and because of the certainty 
that he would be stigmatized by the conviction.”163 Like all human institutions, 
criminal prosecutions are fallible. No one is immune from the possibility that one’s 
liberty could be taken away due to an erroneous verdict. In Justice Brennan’s words: 
“There is always in litigation a margin of error, representing error in factfinding, which 
both parties must take into account.”164 However, while the defendant and the state 
both are affected by an erroneous verdict, the impact is not equivalent. Because a 
guilty verdict potentially takes individuals away from virtually every aspect of their 
normal lives, what the defendant has at stake is “an interest of transcending value.”165 
Moreover, the resources of the two sides in the adversarial proceedings are hardly on 
 
158 U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
159 See, e.g., In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 361 (1970) (“The requirement that guilt of a 
criminal charge be established by proof beyond a reasonable doubt dates at least from our early 
years as a Nation.”). 
160 U.S. CONST. amend. V; see also In re Winship, 397 U.S. at 362–63. 
161 In re Winship, 397 U.S. at 364.  
162 Id. at 363–64. 
163 Id. at 363. 
164 Id. at 364. 
165 Id. 
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a similar scale. The accused is “at a severe disadvantage.”166 For these reasons, it is 
crucial to protect the defendant by requiring the government to prove the elements of 
an offense beyond a reasonable doubt. In light of the power imbalance between the 
parties, it would “amount[] to a lack of fundamental fairness if [the defendant] could 
be adjudged guilty and imprisoned for years on the strength of the same evidence as 
would suffice in a civil case.”167 The beyond a reasonable doubt evidentiary standard 
“provides concrete substance for the presumption of innocence—that bedrock 
‘axiomatic and elementary’ principle whose enforcement lies at the foundation of the 
administration of our criminal law.”168  
The Court’s language in Winship stressed the fundamental nature of the reasonable 
doubt standard. For instance, Justice Brennan referred to the nation’s longstanding 
commitment to this right as “reflect[ing] a profound judgment about the way in which 
law should be enforced and justice administered.”169 In a similar vein, he referred to 
the “vital role” that the reasonable doubt standard “plays . . . in the American scheme 
of criminal procedure,”170 stating that “[i]t is a prime instrument for reducing the risk 
of convictions resting on factual error.”171 Indeed, the standard is “indispensable, for 
it ‘impresses on the trier of fact the necessity of reaching a subjective state of certitude 
of the facts in issue.’”172 Moreover, because of its importance to the balance of power 
between individuals and government, the reasonable doubt standard shapes the way 
that individuals conduct their lives, and their relationship with the instruments of 
official authority. As Justice Brennan wrote in Winship: “It is . . . important in our free 
society that every individual going about his ordinary affairs have confidence that his 
government cannot adjudge him guilty of a criminal offense without convincing a 
proper factfinder of his guilt with utmost certainty.”173 Enforcing the guarantee reflects 
a judgment about the value that a society places on individuals’ liberty, and their 
overriding interest in not being subjected to unjust treatment, as “a society that values 
the good name and freedom of every individual should not condemn a man for 
commission of a crime when there is reasonable doubt about his guilt.”174  
The recent case in which the Court addressed the practice of re-imprisonment 
without a jury trial—United States v. Haymond—provides an excellent example of the 
concrete impact that the applicable evidentiary burden has on individual cases. As 
discussed above, while Haymond was on supervised release, the government sought 
revocation and re-imprisonment based on allegations that he had knowingly been in 
 
166 Id. at 363. 
167 Id. 
168 Id. 
169 Id. at 361–62. 
170 Id. at 363. 
171 Id. 
172 Id. at 364. 
173 Id. 
174 Id. at 363–64.  
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possession of child pornography.175 Employing the “preponderance of the evidence 
standard” that has long been applied in revocation hearings, the district court found 
against Haymond, and, thus, under § 3583(k), had no choice but to sentence him to at 
least five years in prison.176 As described by the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals in 
ruling on Haymond’s appeal, the evidence validly admitted during the hearing showed 
that there were thirteen images of child pornography on Haymond’s cell phone.177 The 
dispute concerned whether Haymond had known about the images or had taken any 
intentional actions to acquire them. The only expert who testified at the hearing 
indicated that there were several plausible ways that the images could have ended up 
on Haymond’s phone without his knowledge, and there was no definitive evidence 
regarding whether Haymond had ever viewed the images.178 In the judgment of the 
Court of Appeals, the evidence against Haymond presented “a close case, even under 
a preponderance of the evidence standard,” although it ultimately concluded that the 
evidence was sufficient under that standard.179 The case strikingly illustrates the 
significance of the evidentiary burden, because the evidence would have been 
nowhere close to supporting a finding of guilt “beyond a reasonable doubt.”  
In light of the tremendous importance of the right to a jury trial, a reasonable doubt 
standard of evidence, and other basic constitutional protections, we should recognize 
the practice of re-imprisoning individuals without affording such protections as a 
remarkable departure that demands the strongest of justifications. We have seen that 
the justification, as explained by the Court, turns on the conception of revocation as 
punishment for the original offense. Unfortunately, that conception does not hold up 
to scrutiny.  
Individuals on supervised release can be re-imprisoned based on a wide variety of 
allegations, ranging from failing to comply with reporting requirements to the 
commission of grave crimes. When the government seeks re-imprisonment, the 
outcome is decided through a process of adversarial litigation presided over by a judge. 
The revocation hearing is aimed at determining whether the defendant is guilty of the 
acts alleged by the government. Based on a finding of guilt, individuals previously 
freed from prison may be returned to prison, potentially for the rest of their lives. For 
defendants at revocation hearings, it is difficult to overstate how much rides on the 
outcome.  
To highlight the potential stakes, consider the situation of an individual who is 
serving a period of supervised release following a short prison term for a relatively 
minor crime. While on supervised release, the individual has been living lawfully, but 
the supervising officer inaccurately comes to believe that the individual has engaged 
in serious criminal activity. Let us assume that the officer who makes the allegations 
has nothing but good intentions and has simply made observations that lend 
 
175 United States v. Haymond, 139 S. Ct. 2369, 2373 (2019). 
176 United States v. Haymond, No. 08-CR-201, 2016 WL 4094886, at *7 (N.D. Okla. Aug. 
2, 2016). The judge in fact imposed the minimum mandatory sentence of five years, to be 
followed by ten more years of supervised release. Id. at *1. 
177 United States v. Haymond, 869 F.3d 1153, 1157 (10th Cir. 2017). 
178 Id. at 1157–58. 
179 Id. at 1159. 
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themselves to an erroneous interpretation of events. Of course, misimpressions, 
mistakes, and misjudgments happen all the time. In itself, there is nothing remarkable 
about a person in an official position arriving at a mistaken impression even with 
nothing but the intention to serve the demands of justice. Normally, however, an 
individual suspected of wrongdoing would be protected from error by the rigorous 
demands that the right to a jury trial and reasonable doubt standard place on the 
prosecution. Especially in a criminal justice system like that of the United States, 
which is centered around the model of adversarial proceedings between the 
government and the individual, protections for individuals depend on precisely how 
the rules of the game are configured. While no system designed and run by fallible 
human beings can be foolproof, the protections provided by the full panoply of 
constitutional rights are robust. Prosecutors have little incentive to bring charges in 
cases where the evidence suggests only a vague likelihood of the defendant’s guilt. 
Even if they do choose to do so, the demands of proving every element of the charged 
offense beyond a reasonable doubt provide considerable protection from an unjust 
outcome. These protections are supposed to reassure individuals that they are very 
unlikely to end up in prison based on the bad luck of events producing a misimpression 
of their guilt. The system promises those not on supervised release that it will, in the 
most literal sense, give them the benefit of the doubt. 
The situation is quite different for individuals on supervised release. To focus for 
the moment on just one of the basic rights not available to them, the difference between 
the “preponderance of the evidence” and “reasonable doubt” standards of evidence is 
enormous. An individual on supervised release faces a dramatically heightened risk of 
being unjustly prosecuted and re-imprisoned for acts that they did not commit. Just as 
the incentives built into the American adversarial system work in favor of individuals 
who enjoy the full panoply of constitutional rights, they work decisively against 
individuals on supervised release. As Justices have recognized both in the context of 
parole and supervised release, prosecutors have every incentive to take advantage of 
the opportunity to litigate cases without affording defendants the full panoply of 
rights.180 As one commentator observes, given the professional guidelines bearing on 
the work of federal prosecutors, they “would be faithfully following directions were 
[they] to routinely choose revocations over trials.”181 
In light of the stakes for defendants, including the possibility of being imprisoned 
for long periods of time for acts they did not commit, the notion that revocation 
amounts to nothing more than “administration” of a sentence already imposed for the 
initial offense loses plausibility. It is worth emphasizing that individuals on supervised 
 
180 See Morrisey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 479 (1972) (“Sometimes revocation occurs when 
the parolee is accused of another crime; it is often preferred to a new prosecution because of the 
procedural ease of recommitting the individual on the basis of a lesser showing by the State.”); 
Haymond, 139 S. Ct. at 2381 (“Instead of seeking a revocation of supervised release, the 
government could have chosen to prosecute Mr. Haymond under a statute mandating a term of 
imprisonment of 10 to 20 years for repeat child-pornography offenders. But why bother with an 
old-fashioned jury trial for a new crime when a quick-and-easy ‘supervised release revocation 
hearing’ before a judge carries a penalty of five years to life?” (citation omitted)). 
181 Danny Zemel, Enforcing Statutory Maximums: How Federal Supervised Release Violates 
the Sixth Amendment Rights Defined in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 52 U. RICH. L. REV. 965, 974 
(2018). 
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release may be imprisoned not only for the commission of crimes, but also for 
violating conditions of their release that would not otherwise be wrongful, such as 
consuming alcohol, or traveling without authorization. Reflecting on circumstances 
that could more plausibly support the treatment of revocation as mere administration 
of a previously imposed sentence further highlights why the theory is flawed as 
presently applied. Let us consider a hypothetical program that will help us to recognize 
particularly problematic features of supervised release as presently constructed. In this 
imagined “afternoon release program,” incarcerated individuals are allowed to spend 
brief intervals of time outside of prison. We can suppose that the program imposes 
certain conditions on individuals participating in it. For instance, continued 
involvement in the program depends on participants only going to places approved in 
advance, and on reporting back to prison by the scheduled time. Now, let us envisage 
a case in which the government alleges that a number of individuals violated the 
conditions of their participation in the program; according to a supervising official, 
these individuals visited unapproved locations and did not report back to prison in a 
timely manner. These individuals deny the allegations and contend that they are 
entitled to a jury trial with the full panoply of rights normally associated with such a 
trial. In the litigation, the government contends that it should not be required to prove 
the allegations beyond a reasonable doubt to a jury before removing individuals from 
the afternoon release program. In the government’s view, it does not constitute a new 
criminal charge when individuals are removed from the program. It would be more 
appropriate, the government argues, to conceive of the afternoon release program as 
part of the administration of the individuals’ initial sentence. Thus, the removal of 
individuals from the program, too, should be understood as part of the administration 
of the initial sentence.  
With respect to the hypothetical afternoon release program just described, the 
government’s position regarding the inapplicability of the right to a jury trial and all 
of the accompanying protections would be entirely reasonable. Of course, individuals 
in the release program would still enjoy the protection of the Due Process Clause. It 
may be that the requirements of due process would compel the government to provide 
some kind of hearing or other process before removing individuals from the program. 
But those kinds of questions would be governed by the balancing test endorsed by the 
Supreme Court in Goldberg v. Kelly182 with the appropriate procedural requirements 
determined based on a weighing of the interests at stake for both the individuals 
involved and the government.  
To continue with consideration of our hypothetical afternoon release program, 
suppose now that evidence surfaces indicating that an inmate participating in the 
program has committed a serious crime during one of the periods of release. If the 
government wanted to seek an additional prison term for the individual based on the 
newly committed crime, it clearly would not be appropriate for it to pursue this using 
the same procedural machinery that was in place for removing individuals from the 
afternoon release program. Instead, in such circumstances, it would be necessary for 
the government to bring criminal charges in a new case in which the defendant would 
unambiguously stand as the accused in a fresh criminal prosecution. As such, the 
 
182 Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262–63 (1970). As discussed above, in Goldberg, the 
Court held that the government was required to provide a pretermination hearing before cutting 
off the benefits of a welfare recipient. Id. at 263–64. 
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defendant would be entitled to the full panoply of constitutional protections that 
accompanies such a prosecution. 
It is helpful to contrast the first hypothetical case discussed above—where the 
government seeks to diminish an individual’s participation in the afternoon release 
program based on their failure to comply with the conditions—with cases in which the 
government seeks to re-imprison an individual on supervised release. In the 
hypothetical case, the government’s allegations concern the defendant’s participation 
in the afternoon release program, and it is the defendant’s continued participation in 
the program which will be at stake in the proceedings. The individual has failed to 
comply with the requirements that comprise the administration of the program itself, 
and, as a result, access to that program may be limited or denied. This makes it more 
reasonable than in the context of supervised release to characterize the punishment 
involved (“revocation” of the individual’s participation in the afternoon release 
program) merely as part of the “administration” of a sentence that was previously 
imposed. With respect to the revocation of supervised release, the potential 
punishment is not cabined in the same manner. A defendant at a supervised release 
revocation hearing potentially faces years of imprisonment—a punishment unrelated 
to the administration of supervised release—for actions unrelated to the administration 
of supervised release. To be sure, supervised release includes as a condition that 
individuals do not commit crimes. The difficulty, however, concerns the extraordinary 
breadth of this condition. It lacks a connection to the circumstances in which the 
particular individual is serving the period of supervised release. Indeed, we are all 
subject to the requirements of the criminal law. The difference, of course, is that most 
people are entitled to the full slate of constitutional protections if we are accused of 
crimes. It is one thing to withhold the usual constitutional protections in tweaking 
details of the manner in which one serves a sentence for actions directly related to 
those details (as in the case of disallowing individuals in the hypothetical to continue 
participating in the afternoon release program because they did not return at the 
appointed time). However, it is quite another to withhold the usual constitutional 
protections in trying individuals on supervised release for alleged crimes despite their 
having no connection to the manner in which the release is overseen.  
Another significant difference between the hypothetical case and the revocation of 
supervised release concerns the implications on individuals’ lives of depriving them 
of basic procedural protections. Knowing that one might be officially sanctioned 
without access to a reasonable doubt standard can have a chilling effect on one’s 
behavior. People may alter their behavior to minimize the chances that they will be 
sanctioned for acts that they did not actually commit. In contrast with the stringent 
reasonable-doubt standard, the preponderance of the evidence standard requires the 
prosecution only to show that it is slightly more likely than not that the defendant 
committed the alleged acts. To cite just one illustrative example, suppose there is a 
protest organized by a social organization in the downtown area of a city. An 
individual who is sympathetic to the cause of the protesters and interested in political 
events is weighing whether to attend. To what extent should the fear of being wrongly 
accused of criminal acts relating to the protest be taken into account? The calculation 
may well be different for an individual on supervised release than for one not subject 
to the same deprivation of rights. The individual on supervised release knows that the 
prosecution would face a relatively low evidentiary standard in any resulting trial. This 
heightens the possibility of being convicted for a crime that the person did not commit. 
If there are allegations, say, of theft, or the intentional destruction of property, an 
individual on supervised release might choose to stay away from the protest for fear 
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of being spotted in the vicinity of alleged crimes, which could be enough to encourage 
prosecutors to pursue charges. However, an individual who enjoys the full slate of 
constitutional protections might have substantially less to worry about in this regard, 
since the prosecution would need much more convincing evidence to establish a 
winning case. The chilling effect of diminished rights protections is more concerning 
with respect to individuals on supervised release than it is with respect to individuals 
in the afternoon release program. To minimize any chance of false allegations, 
individuals in the afternoon release program might, say, return to the prison well 
before the prescribed time, or avoid going even to some of the locations on the 
approved list. While regrettable, the impact of this kind of behavioral self-censorship 
is relatively limited; it affects inmates only with respect to their behavior during brief 
periods of time during the course of their prison terms. By contrast, the impact of 
diminished rights on individuals on supervised release is pervasive, since it applies to 
their behavior at all times. 
Focusing on stakes helps us to appreciate that the manner in which the term 
“punishment” has been used in justifying revocation without a jury trial rings hollow. 
The oft-repeated justification for the practice is that revocation is not meant as 
punishment for acts committed following the initial sentence; the only punishment that 
the individual is undergoing is that declared by the initial sentence. But it is worth 
pausing to reflect on what is supposed to be conveyed by the term “punishment” in 
this formulation. Is this supposed to be a reference to the purpose behind the harsh 
treatment—imprisonment—that the individual is being compelled to endure? Surely, 
individuals’ access to the Constitution’s protections cannot properly be thought to turn 
on the label attached to the policy reason behind why an individual is being 
imprisoned. Suppose the government announced at the initial prosecution that its aim 
in seeking to put the defendant behind bars was not punishment at all but was simply 
to offer the individual an opportunity for rehabilitation. This would not alter the 
individuals’ access to constitutional protections. A new characterization of the same 
harsh treatment would not change the constitutional landscape. What entitles 
defendants to the full panoply of constitutional rights is the fact that the government 
is making a bid to deprive them of their liberty in such a far-reaching manner. At a 
revocation hearing, the government is seeking to do the same, and it is doing so on the 
basis of specified acts that the defendant has allegedly committed a substantial period 
of time after the initial sentence. That an individual on supervised release was afforded 
the full set of constitutional protections before being found guilty of earlier acts should 
not mean that they may be found guilty of entirely separate, later acts, without those 
protections. Referring to the defendant’s potential re-imprisonment as 
“administration” or “punishment for an earlier offense” hardly changes the essential 
nature of the proceedings. The individual is being charged with having engaged in 
particular behaviors, and, if found to have committed them may be subjected to time 
in prison. Our system of criminal justice allows the government to put people in prison 
for periods of time based on their misdeeds. That much is not controversial. However, 
the Constitution provides a robust set of protections for individuals accused of crimes, 
recognizing the stakes for defendants and the tremendous power imbalance between 
defendants and the government within a system that pits parties against one another in 
an adversarial contest. Defendants at revocations hearings deserve no less.  
In response to the line of argument just advanced for distinguishing the afternoon 
release program from supervised release, one might object that the supposed 
difference described is really no difference at all. That is, it might be argued, just like 
individuals in the afternoon release program, the liberty of individuals on supervised 
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release is subject to a number of conditions, including that they do not engage in 
unlawful activities. However, while it is true that an individual in the afternoon release 
program and an individual on supervised release both are subject to conditions, there 
is a tremendous difference with respect to the consequences for being found to have 
violated those conditions. What individuals in the afternoon release program have at 
stake is access to that program for the remainder of their prison term. To be sure, 
participation in the program may mean a good deal to individuals in the program. 
Nevertheless, even if they are found to have violated the conditions of the program, 
the worst consequences to which they are subject is that they will serve out the same 
prison term to which they were initially sentenced without access to program that 
makes completing the term somewhat less onerous. The difference between being in 
prison with or without access to the program pales in comparison to the difference 
between serving a prison term and being freed from prison. In contrast with individuals 
in the afternoon release program, individuals on supervised release are not subject 
only to the possibility of being denied access to a particular program during the course 
of their existing sentence. Instead, they face the possibility of being removed from 
their lives outside of prison and subjected to a newly prescribed prison term. These 
are individuals conducting lives outside of prison, embedded in all of the same kinds 
of aspects of a complete life as anyone else. What is at stake for them is not 
participation in a program that makes time in prison a little more bearable, but 
participation in a full life outside of prison. With stakes that high, to say that 
individuals on supervised release are not entitled to the usual constitutional protections 
because revocation constitutes mere “administration” of an existing sentence lacks 
plausibility.  
The conventional justification for revocation and re-imprisonment without a jury 
trial emphasizes that individuals on supervised release enjoy only conditional liberty, 
rather than the unconditional liberty enjoyed by others. It is true, of course, that the 
criminal justice system is built on the idea that being convicted of a crime may result 
in individuals’ loss of freedoms that they enjoyed prior to their conviction. Society 
itself depends on the notion that communities may impose consequences for violation 
of their established laws. It is also true that individuals on supervised release are 
subjected to certain conditions as part of the consequences for their criminal 
convictions. Just as serving time in prison is a pre-established possible consequence 
for breaking the law, so too is serving a term of supervised release. And supervised 
release, by its very nature, entails impositions on an individual’s freedom that they 
would not incur had it not been for the criminal conviction that was the basis for their 
sentence. Nevertheless, noting that supervised release entails certain conditions that 
do not apply to the general population does not necessarily establish that any condition 
whatsoever may be imposed. There are limits on what kinds of conditions may be 
punitively imposed. A judge surely could not include as a condition of supervised 
release that an individual work twenty hours a day, or that they become practitioners 
of a religion they do not support. These might seem like silly examples because they 
are so extreme, but what they illustrate is that invocation of the idea of “conditional 
liberty” does not close off all possible questions regarding the acceptability of any 
particular conditions that might be imposed as part of supervised release. 
While there is surely a sense in which everyone on supervised release could be 
said to enjoy only diminished rights as compared to others, not all states of diminished 
rights are equivalent. It is one thing, say, to require individuals to report to a 
supervising official at regular intervals, and it is quite another to deprive them of the 
constitutional rights that guard against unjust convictions. As we have seen, the 
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conventional justification for revocation without a jury trial works by emphasizing the 
distinction between administration of the initial sentence and the imposition of a new 
sentence. The pivotal move is to attribute new consequences imposed on defendants 
to old acts committed by the defendants. If an individual was initially sentenced to a 
year in prison at time zero, and then is re-imprisoned years later for a term of life, that 
re-imprisonment is supposed to be understood as a development arising in the course 
of administering the initial sentence. This way of framing supervised release has the 
effect of blurring the distinction between all of the different kinds of freedoms that 
individuals on supervised release find to be diminished or severely compromised. The 
idea is that individuals on supervised release enjoy only conditional liberty, and the 
unavailability of the right to a jury trial is just one more of the unfortunate but 
foreseeable consequences for violating the law. However, we should recognize the 
constitutional rights that protect us from unjust convictions as having a special 
importance which makes it inappropriate to withhold them from individuals on 
supervised release. The first reason is a theme we have already stressed: the stakes 
involved for a defendant charged with crimes. Other components of supervised release 
have limited scope and impact on the course of an individual’s life. They intrude on 
one feature in the landscape of freedom while leaving others intact. For example, an 
individual on supervised release might not be permitted to visit specified places or 
may be required to notify authorities before changing one’s employment status. While 
these and other conditions are not insubstantial, they leave large swaths of individuals’ 
lives untouched. By contrast, the right to a jury trial—and the associated procedural 
protections—serve as a bulwark against being subjected unjustly to the most serious 
criminal sentences. If these rights are severely compromised, then an individual may 
be deprived of liberty in the most thoroughgoing manner through the imposition of an 
additional prison term. 
A point that is not unrelated to the stakes, but is conceptually distinct, concerns the 
manner in which the current system reorders the relation between the most awesome 
powers of government and the protection of individuals from the inappropriate use of 
those powers. There is no aspect of government more fundamental to its role as the 
guardian of peace and order than its authority to impose negative consequences on 
individuals who violate the laws. This power may be indispensable to civilized society 
as we know it, but it is also breathtaking in its scope. It means not merely that the 
agencies of government have the capacity to deprive individuals of their liberty for the 
remainder of their lives, but that one would be committing another wrong by forcefully 
resisting. The law requires that those subject to it comply even with its directives to 
suffer the consequences for violating it. It is worth stressing such familiar and obvious 
ideas to highlight the fundamental importance of the procedural protections that limit 
the government’s awesome power to imprison. These protections, which are 
extraordinarily important in their immediate, practical impact on individual lives, 
express the society’s respect for individuals’ liberty. By requiring the government to 
meet very substantial hurdles before exercising the power to imprison a person, we 
recognize the importance of that person’s liberty. Something so precious must not be 
taken away lightly. We value it so highly that we make it difficult to destroy. Thus, in 
addition to its tangible force, access to the full panoply of constitutional rights assures 
individuals that the governmental institutions with power over them place the highest 
significance on their liberty. 
Yet, despite the elemental significance that constitutional rights have in protecting 
us from inappropriate exercises of governmental power, the current system withholds 
such rights from individuals on supervised release. As a result, the practice of revoking 
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supervised release without a jury trial takes on far-reaching significance. To 
systematically deprive individuals of basic constitutional procedural protections for 
extended periods of time amounts to treating large populations of people as holding 
second-class status. Individuals on supervised release have completed their prison 
terms. They are free to resume their lives, to pursue employment, to form 
relationships, and to establish all of the other kinds of commitments and projects that 
all of us do. But there is one tremendous, unjustifiable difference between individuals 
on supervised release and those around them: they may be sent to prison for long 
periods of time based on nothing more than a showing to a judge that it is more likely 
than not that they have engaged in prohibited activity. That is a tremendous burden to 
bear, one that radically and unjustifiably alters the nature of one’s relation to the 
institutions of power. Since a term of supervised release composes part of an initial 
sentence, it justifiably may impose certain restrictions on an individual’s liberty that 
would not otherwise apply, such as refraining from the consumption of alcohol or 
traveling to particular locations. However, in enforcing those limitations, the 
government should either limit the consequences of violations to relatively minor 
matters, such as an adjustment in the details of the stated conditions or provide the 
normal panoply constitutional protections. 
Individuals not on supervised release can expect and demand that they be granted 
the benefit of the doubt should circumstances produce a mistaken impression that they 
have engaged in wrongdoing. They enjoy sufficient procedural protections to provide 
them, at least in principle, with an excellent chance of avoiding an erroneous 
conviction.183 But the preponderance of evidence standard is not nearly so forgiving. 
It is easy for it to appear “more likely than not” that a person has committed an act 
that they did not, in fact, commit. Yet, when that happens to individuals on supervised 
release, it can destroy lives. Consider a person on supervised release who is living in 
a lawful manner, and who has fully integrated into life outside of prison. The person 
has violated no conditions of release and has committed no crimes, but is, nevertheless, 
accused of having done so. The evidence is relatively weak. The government would 
have little to no hope of convincing a jury of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Precisely 
for this reason, no responsible prosecutor would seriously consider mounting a 
criminal prosecution in the case. In this instance, however, the government, knowing 
it need only show that the allegations are likely to be true, decides to pursue 
revocation. The literal benefit of the doubt available to the rest of us is not on offer. 
Despite being able to present only weak and mixed evidence, the judge finds that the 
government has met its burden under the “preponderance of the evidence” standard, 
and the individual is sentenced to a long prison term. The story of this person’s life 
has been rewritten in a way that is sweeping and unjust. Instead of being a success 
story of rehabilitation—of turning one’s life around—this now is a recidivist who just 
could not stay out of trouble. It is notable that nothing in this tale depends on malice. 
The government officials who make the choice to pursue revocation may genuinely 
 
183 As I write this Article in the late Spring of 2020, the nation is roiling with anger and 
frustration regarding the death of George Floyd at the hands of police officers. That tragedy has 
focused attention on racial injustice in a particularly pointed manner. It is clearly not the case 
that everyone in America can enjoy the same kind of confidence that they will be treated justly 
by the institutions of official power. In referring to the benefit of the doubt that individuals not 
on supervised release receive, I am simply speaking of the applicability of basic procedural 
protections, in principle, as required by the Constitution.  
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believe in the individual’s guilt and that they are acting to protect the public from an 
individual who has proven dangerous more than once. Indeed, instead of receiving a 
benefit of the doubt, people in this situation may suffer from the assumption of 
officials that they are even more likely to have committed the alleged acts in light of 
their criminal histories. Sadly, the people most in need of the benefit of the doubt are 
the ones systematically deprived of it. 
The Supreme Court’s justification for upholding the current system of supervised 
release depends on a legal fiction: that when the government seeks to re-imprison 
defendants based on the commission of crimes, those defendants do not stand as the 
accused in a criminal prosecution. By recognizing this justification as resting on a 
fiction, we can also recognize that the current system effectively establishes a second-
class tier of rights protection, one that is assigned only to a subset of the population 
that is, in effect, assigned to a second-class status of personhood.  
V. CONCLUSION 
Since the Supreme Court has so recently handed down a decision limiting the 
government’s power to re-imprison individuals on supervised release without a jury 
trial—in United States v. Haymond184—it might seem odd to claim that the issue has 
not received the attention it deserves, and that the Court itself has failed to recognize 
the injustice of the practice. However, attention to the three opinions in Haymond 
reveals that all of the Justices continued to endorse a conception of supervised release 
that justifies providing only diminished rights to individuals on supervised release. It 
was not only the four dissenting Justices who advocated such a conception. Justice 
Breyer’s concurring opinion expressed agreement with the general approach 
expressed by Justice Alito’s dissent.185 His disagreement with the dissent was quite 
limited, as it applied only to certain aspects of the manner in which a particular 
provision was framed: 18 U.S.C. § 3583(k).186 He fully agreed with the dissent, for 
instance, that “the role of the judge in a supervised-release proceeding is consistent 
with traditional parole,” and that the Apprendi line of cases should not be applied in 
the context of supervised release.187 Thus, Justice Breyer’s views, even if adopted by 
the Court as a whole, would have little or no effect on most individuals on supervised 
release.  
It might seem at first that Justice Gorsuch’s plurality opinion went much further in 
reconceiving the nature of supervised release. But that impression is misleading. Not 
only did the plurality’s reasoning not disrupt the longstanding justification for 
depriving individuals on supervised release of basic rights, it absolutely depended on 
that justification.188 The key to the justification for the diminished rights of supervised 
release is the view that revocation does not constitute punishment for new offenses, 
but rather, punishment for the offenses that were the basis of the initial conviction. Far 
 
184 United States v. Haymond, 139 S. Ct. 2369, 2373 (2019). 
185 Id. at 2385 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
186 Id. at 2386. 
187 Id. at 2385. 
188 Id. at 2376–77 (plurality opinion). 
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from overthrowing that view, the plurality relied on it in applying the Apprendi189 line 
of cases to the context of revoking supervised release.190 In Alleyne, one of the most 
significant cases building on Apprendi, the Court held that a “fact that, by law, 
increases the penalty for a crime is an ‘element’ that must be submitted to the jury and 
found beyond a reasonable doubt,” and it applied this principle to facts serving as the 
basis for mandatory minimum sentences.191 Alleyne is pivotal to the plurality’s 
reasoning in Haymond, and it takes as a premise that the enhancement applies to the 
penalty determined by the judge at the initial sentencing.192 
While some legal fictions may be benign, the one that the Court has used to uphold 
re-imprisonment of individuals on supervised release without a jury trial is pernicious. 
Imagining the position of defendants at revocation hearings is illuminating. Consider 
the case of an individual serving a term of supervised release who is alleged to have 
committed a serious crime, carrying a potential sentence of decades in prison, or even 
a life term. As the individual walks into the courtroom, there is a possibility that the 
individual will be discharged with no repercussions, and there is a possibility that the 
individual will be returned to prison for a lengthy term. The actual outcome will hinge 
on whether the judge in that courtroom finds that the government has met its burden 
of showing that its allegations are true by a “preponderance of the evidence.” Virtually 
the entire course of this individual’s life hangs in the balance, and it turns on whether 
the government’s allegations about the individual’s behavior are found to be true. The 
individual protests: but how can you determine my fate based on such a thin margin 
of evidence, and without providing me with the normal constitutional protections that 
others take for granted? The answer that the Court’s jurisprudence suggests is that the 
defendant’s protest is meritless. After all, the reasoning goes, the term that might be 
handed down would not constitute a punishment for the offenses that the government 
demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence at the hearing. It would just be part 
of the administration of the initial sentence. The question is whether we can say that 















189 Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 468 (2000). 
190 Haymond, 139 S. Ct. at 2376–78. 
191 Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99, 103 (2013). 
192 Haymond, 139 S. Ct. at 2378. 
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